Tuesday, May 08, 2007
via Little Green Football:
I realize we
shouldn’t expect murderers whose entire lives revolve around genocidal
hatred to follow rules of logic. But don’t these cretinous killers in
cheap suits feel any cognitive discomfort at all when in one breath,
they commit themselves and all future Palestinian generations to
eternal war until the Jews are wiped out, and in the next breath say,
“The Zionist entity is incapable of making peace?”
“Incapable of making peace” means: won’t just lay down and be slaughtered.
And “true solution” is very reminiscent of a similar phrase from last century.
(Courtesy of MEMRI TV.)
Commentary :
Little Green Footballs,
Please compile a
list of the people killed in the conflict between Israelis and
Palestinians. You will know who is slaughtering whom. More than 300
Palestinians have been killed by the Israeli security forces since June 2005. This has
been admitted by the prime minister Olmert.
There is no
doubt Hamas is a militant organization. The way of violence adopted
by Hamas is giving Israelis the pretext to kill and destroy Palestinian
people. Portraying every Muslim as terrorist will not solve the problem
. It will aggravate the prevailing crisis in the Middle East.
Monday, May 07, 2007
by Barry Rubin
One
of the Middle East's biggest, least-discussed mysteries has been
how to understand Israelis. This is a long, complex subject. But
so many, including Arab friends, have asked me to explain about this
issue that there is an obvious need for clarification here.
Here we go. From
1967 on, Israelis had a great debate. Both sides agreed the Palestinians
and most Arab states weren't ready for peace. But the left thought
big concessions could bring a permanent political deal once the other
side began to change. The right doubted this would happen, and settlements
in the captured territories would consolidate control there. Only a
small minority saw permanent retention of the territories as a religious
obligation. Most Israelis supported holding that land and building
settlements as a strategic tactic.
By the end of the 1980s,
signs of a real shift in Palestinian positions were still limited. But in the
early 1990s, Iraq's defeat by a U.S.-led coalition and the PLO's low point seemed
to offer a true opportunity. Rather than try to crush the Palestinian movement
forever--something that would have fit the demonization of Israel stereotype--the
country offered confidence-building measures and concessions in exchange for
real peace. The result: the 1993 "Oslo" agreement
and the ensuing peace process.
With the long-awaited moment
perhaps at hand, debate within Israel shifted. The left claimed that Palestinian
leader Yasir Arafat would make and implement a compromise peace. The right claimed
he would do so and then break it. Hardly anyone believed Arafat would turn down
even a good deal.
The test came with the
Camp David meeting in mid-2000 and the offer by President Bill Clinton, with
the agreement of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, at the end of 2000. The final
offer--and even this was only the minimal proposal for starting negotiations--was
a West Bank-Gaza Strip Palestinian state with the equivalent of all the pre-1967
land (with small swaps to make up for Israeli annexation of a few areas) plus
a capital in east Jerusalem and massive reparations payments. Arafat turned it
down and instead turned to renewed violence and terrorism.
At this point, Israeli
perceptions were turned upside down. The high hopes of the 1990s (even my conservative
friends, while balking at turning over east Jerusalem, had accepted large concessions
and a Palestinian state in exchange for peace)
crashed.
Internationally, Israelis
had suffered two betrayals. First, there was the Palestinian leadership's use
of concessions to strike against Israel directly and undermine its position internationally.
After all, Israel's own government had dismantled the negative image of the PLO
as a movement whose goals were Israel's destruction and whose means was terrorism.
(On one memorable occasion, some American Jewish leaders rewrote a speech for
Arafat to make it sound more moderate.)
The other betrayal came
from the West, especially Europe. For years, Israel had been told that if it
made concessions and took risks for peace, it would have international backing
if anything went wrong. Now, subjected to a terrorist assault whose bloodiness
was made possible by Israel's own admission of so many returning Palestinians,
sponsorship for aid to them, and turning over of territory to their control,
Israel also faced the most hostile Western policies and image,
too.
Within the country, a new
consensus emerged, taking one idea from the left and one idea from the right.
From the left, most Israelis accepted the idea of giving up the territories and
agreeing to a Palestinian state in exchange for real peace. From the right, the
majority concluded that there was not going to be a Palestinian partner for peace
or a negotiated resolution for many years to come. Of course, not everyone took
this conclusion but most did. On this basis, friends of mine who habitually voted
for Meretz on the left now cast their votes for Ariel Sharon
to be prime minister.
After a half-century of
warfare, in which everyone knows someone or has relatives who have died in war
or terrorism, most Israelis are still eager for peace. They are not motivated
because they think Israel weak or are afraid, but simply from feeling strongly
that peace is preferable to war.
Digging in for the long
run, they backed withdrawal from southern Lebanon and from the Gaza Strip. They
were ready to pull out of much of the West Bank as well. Whether these withdrawals
were a good or bad idea is another column; yet, they were certainly an attempt
to show Israel's desire to not be "occupying" another people. At that point,
it was up to the Palestinians to show what they would do with the opportunity.
The election of Hamas and the continuation of terrorism
was the result.
After all this
political talk, it should be added that no country in the world--perhaps in
history--has so many rapid psychological ups, downs, and dramatic changes as Israel. Yet,
public opinion polls show a remarkably high level of personal satisfaction. The
economy has boomed; progress continued. Whatever problems the country has--also
another column--there is a strong sense of optimism and willingness to examine
faults to repair them.
Which reminds me of how
one day I took a U.S. newspaper, walked down Shenkin street in Tel Aviv jammed
with people, finally found an empty chair in a cafe, and read the front-page
article, which explained how Israelis were so fearful of terrorism that nobody
went out any more.
Sunday, May 06, 2007
Adam Entous reports :
"Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert opted on Sunday against firing his
deputy, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, saying they would continue to
work together despite her call for his resignation.
Livni issued a public call last week for Olmert to step down following
the release of an official report sharply criticising his handling of
last year's war in Lebanon."
Analysts say that this reprieve is temporary. The cause of this rapprochment is that government's main coalition partner, the left-leaning Labour party, is
considering bolting, a move that could trigger snap elections.
Sunday, May 06, 2007
Uri Avnery challenges
Israel’s anti-Olmert protesters to focus on the real issues that will
bring real peace to the Middle East: justice for the Palestinians and
an end to the occupation. I have been to many demonstrations in Tel-Aviv's Rabin Square, even when it was still called "Kings of Israel Square". I
was at the legendary "Demonstration of the 400000" after the Sabra and
Shatila massacre (actually, there were around 200000, which is still an
impressive number). I was there when Yitzhak Rabin was shot. I was
there when masses of young people sat on the ground, weeping silently
and lighting candles for the murdered leader (It was said at the time
that the young generation had finally woken up. But the young
generation dried its tears and went on its way together with the
cameras). I was there when 100000 streamed to the square quite
spontaneously and erupted in an outburst of joy after Ehud Barak won
the elections and delivered Israel from the nightmare of Benjamin
Netanyahu (even if many of them regretted it later). But
the demonstration in which I took part the day before yesterday was
different from all its predecessors. There were people from the left
and right, religious and secularists, Orientals and Ashkenazim,
settlers and peace activists, young (many young) and elderly. At one
point I passed MK [Member of the Knesset, or parliament] Effi Eitam,
whom I consider the No. 1 fascist in Israel, and who may well consider
me the No. 1 destroyer of Israel. We ignored each other, but we were
both there. It was an uprising of citizens
who came together to shout: Enough chutzpah! After the shameful fiasco
in Lebanon, the leaders should have resigned at once. The more so after
the scathing report of the Winograd commission. As the writer Meir
Shalev, one of the speakers at the rally, declared: "Mr Olmert, you
said that you work for us. You are fired!"... The
demonstration was aimed at three persons: the prime minister, the
minister of defence and the chief of staff at the time of the war. Dan
Halutz has already drawn the right conclusion and resigned. True, in
the Book of Proverbs (24,17) the Bible commands us: "Rejoice not when
thine enemy falleth, and let not thine heart be glad when he
stumbleth," but, frankly, I permitted myself to rejoice and verily mine
heart was gladdened. The story started when
Halutz was commander of the air force. In order to kill the Hamas
leader, Salah Shehadeh, he ordered the dropping of a one-tonne bomb on
his house, which also killed 15 civilians, including nine children. We
sent him and his colleagues letters, warning them that we may sue them
for war crimes. When Halutz was asked how he feels when releasing such
a bomb, he answered that he feels a slight bump on his wing. He added
that we were traitors, and that we should be brought to trial. (Treason
is the only crime still punishable by death under Israeli law.) When
Halutz was appointed chief of staff, we protested in front of the
General Staff building. The protest was not only motivated by moral
considerations, profound as they were. We also warned against giving
the command of the army to a person whose boastful style testified to
his being reckless, irresponsible and devoid of judgment. Now
comes the Winograd commission and repeats almost the same words. But in
the meantime 119 Israeli soldiers, 40 Israeli civilians and about a
thousand Lebanese have been killed - because the pitiful political
leadership was mesmerized by this winged nincompoop. The
crowd in the square directed its anger at Ehud Olmert, and to a lesser
degree at the pathetic Amir Peretz. As is usual in the era of
television, when the cameras can only focus on faces and not ideas,
everything is personal. The entire protest was focused on individuals. That
was quite justified. This man Olmert has proved to be an arrogant and
foolhardy leader, who rushed into a war with minimal knowledge of the
situation in Lebanon, the capabilities of the army, the vulnerability
of Israel's civilian population to rockets. He did not consider any
alternatives. His only field of expertise is party manipulations, as he
is proving again now. What is Olmert
accused of? That he decided to go to war rashly. That the war had no
clearly defined political and military goals. That he did not mobilize
the reserves in time and did not make sure that the forces were
properly trained and equipped. That he did not deploy the ground forces
in time. That he decided on a big ground attack at the last moment,
after the UN had already adopted the cease-fire resolution, and thus
squandered the lives of 40 more soldiers. All these accusations are accurate. But they also include a large measure of escapism. That
is a trait of the Israeli people (and perhaps of all peoples): they do
all they can to avoid discussing the real disease and busy themselves
with secondary, sometimes trivial, symptoms. After
the 1973 war, the people did not ask: Why did Golda Meir not respond to
Anwar Sadat's peace offer before the war? Why did we spend, after the
1967 war, six long years on victory festivals, vainglorious speeches
and putting up settlements, instead of seizing a unique opportunity for
making peace? Why was the ship of state run like a ship of fools? Instead
of posing these questions, the Israeli public focused its frustrations,
anger and protests on two questions: "Why were the reserves not called
up? Why were the instruments (meaning tanks and artillery) not moved
forward (on the eve of the war)?" Valid questions, but secondary ones.
The Agranat Commision also focused on them. The masses demonstrated
because of them. Menachem Begin rode on them to victory. The
same happened after the First Lebanon War. The condemnation was rightly
focused on the Sabra and Shatila massacre. Because of it, the Kahan
Commission was appointed. Because of it, the legendary
mega-demonstration in Kings of Israel Square took place. Because of it,
Ariel Sharon was driven out of the Ministry of Defence. But the main
question was not asked: Why did Begin and Sharon invade Lebanon at all?
Why did they prefer the Golan Heights to peace, as Moshe Dayan had
previously preferred Sharm-el-Sheikh to peace? Why did they start an
adventure that lasted for 18 years, at the price of more than a
thousand Israeli soldiers, a war whose only lasting result was the rise
to power of Hizbullah? Now it is happening again. Should
we topple Olmert? Perhaps it would be better to replace Olmert with
Tzipi Livni or Shimon Peres? (No, I'm not joking.) Or maybe it would be
better to hold new elections, even if Netanyahu might win them? Is the
failed Netanyahu better than the failed Olmert, or must we bring back
the failed Barak? Or perhaps we should leave Olmert in place after all,
in the hope that he won't start any more wars without thinking? But the real question is not why Olmert started the war in haste, but why he started the war at all. Every
right-thinking person understands that Hizbullah can be neutralized
only by making peace with Syria, a peace for which we must give back
the Golan Heights. What is more important for us - peace or the Golan?
The Golan (and the God-forsaken Shebaa Farms) or peace with Lebanon? About
that no serious debate is being held - not in the Knesset, nor in the
media, nor in public discussions. That was not the reason the masses
assembled in the square. That is too complicated. That is too
controversial. That needs cool thinking, drawing conclusions from what
has happened. It is easier to shout "Olmert Go Home!" Yes,
Olmert must indeed go home. We need a new leadership, one that
understands that Israel will know tranquility only if we make peace
with the Palestinians, even when the price is the dismantling of
settlements. Is this being discussed seriously? Would this demand draw
hundreds of thousands to the square? Of course not. In
Thursday's [3 May] demonstration, Meir Shalev brought up the subject of
the occupation and the settlements, much to the displeasure of the
organizers who wanted to preserve unity. Some of the demonstrators
protested (while others applauded). After all, that is controversial.
So why talk about it on this festive occasion? Because
in the absence of a discussion of the issues that will determine our
fate, everything else turns into an exercise in escapism. Standing
in the square, between men wearing knitted kippas and men wearing
T-shirts, orthodox women with long sleeves and women wearing very
un-orthodox tight jeans, I could not avoid a bitter thought: Where the
hell were you when your voices could have saved so many lives? Were you
saluting Olmert the avenging hero, when he sent you into the war? And
you journalists who, almost all of you, called upon the people to come
and protest, didn't you call upon the people with the same enthusiasm
to go to war? What do we need now: to
prepare for the next war - or to prevent the next war? To set up a
government that will invade Lebanon again, and perhaps Syria, too, in
order to "restore the deterrent power of the army" - or a government
that will start serious negotiations to achieve peace?.
Sunday, May 06, 2007
via Telegraph.co.uk:
"Tzipi Livni has made clear that she wants to be Israel's first female
prime minister since Golda Meir but she faces deep misgivings inside
the male-dominated militaristic society.
Mrs Livni, a former spy, is popular among Israelis, having steered
clear of recent corruption scandals and escaped rebuke for last
summer's war.
But if the married mother-of-two is to become premier, she must first
overcome the old-boy network that dominates Israeli politics and
convince her fellow Kadima Party MPs - and the Israeli public - that a
woman is capable of leading the country at a time of crisis.
Mrs Livni's critics use the sort of vocabulary that makes women's
rights activist shudder: unripe, indecisive, unsure of herself and even
"European", which for many Israelis is synonymous with spineless and
effete.
"Israel is still a chauvinistic and militaristic society and it's very
hard for Israelis to accept a woman prime minister, or women in very
senior positions," said Zahava Gal-On, an MP from the Left-wing Meretz
Party and a women's rights activist.
Saturday, May 05, 2007
Ma'aleh Levona, Israel
May Day! May Day!
That has been the cry going out from the "prime
minister" Ehud Olmert and "security minister" Amir Peretz, the Two Stooges whose
goose was cooked when the Winograd Report hit the fan during the evening hours of 30
April. The Third Stooge, former IDF "chief of staff" Dan Halutz, had already
been sacked and is now hiding out at Harvard in the groves of academe. Various
press reports have talked about how scathing the report was etc., etc., and of
the "political earthquake" that hit Israel.
Gimme a break!
From
hundreds of anecdotal reports, Israeli soldiers were sent forth without adequate
supplies to engage the enemy in the north, HizbAllah, attacking them along
the line of expectation, the precise path that HizbAllah expected to be
attacked.
Woo hoo! Way to go, retard!
The sins of Olmert and
crew have already been hashed over hundreds of times since last July, when the
fool brazenly bragged about recovering hostages "kidnapped" by HizbAllah in the
north and Hamas in the south - and then refused to follow even a reasonable
strategy to do so. Everyone has been calling for the idiots' heads since being
sent home from the north with reservists leaving huge signs at the edge of
Jerusalem - "Take Responsibility For Your Mistakes! Quit and Go
Home!"
When the Katyusha rockets began hitting the northern third of
Israel last July 12th, the government and administration ran away, leaving the
citizenry to fend for themselves. The government has not even transferred to the
"responsible authorities," the idiots who ran away, the millions of shekels
needed to enable the recovery of the northern part of the country. Today, there
is a general strike in the north to protest that fact.
All the Winograd
Report has done has been to put the obvious into official language that not even
the pretentiously magisterial Olmert, or the "little captain" Peretz, can deny.
Getting Around the Rule of Law
Let's do a little analysis
of all this, remembering these points. Olmert, who was the Vice Prime Minister
when Ariel Sharon had his major stroke early in 2006, was kept in office by a
subterfuge of the law. Ariel Sharon did in fact die in Hadassah Hospital, as
David Bedein reported. But he was dragged back from the dead, and stuck on life
support machines for political reasons.
According to Israeli law, had
Sharon been declared dead, the head of the political party he headed when he
became prime minister in 2003 would have succeeded to the position of interim
prime minister, and new elections would have been called. The head of the
political party that Sharon headed upon accession to the prime minister's office
in 2003 was the head of the Likud party, Benyamin Netanyahu.
By
declaring the prime minister "impaired," Attorney General Menahem Mazuz avoided
the possibility of Netanyahu becoming prime minister and thus allowed Ehud
Olmert, and Sharon's fake political creation that Olmert now headed, "Kadima,"
to continue in office and attempt to form a government if it won a sufficient
number of seats in the elections.
So an operation was done upon a corpse,
and reports came out regularly about Ariel Sharon's condition to maintain the
fiction that he was the sitting prime minister, while Ehud Olmert ran for office
while sitting in the prime minister's chair. Now that Olmert has been in office
for a year and half, Sharon has been airbrushed out of the political photos.
Scarcely a word is said about the corpse of a man hooked up to life support
machines.
Why?
Way back in 2004, Sharon, after declaring his
intent to pull out of Gush Katif, offered to hold a referendum within the Likud party to allow
the members of the Likud, whom he represented, to decide on pulling out. It
appeared at first that he would actually follow the desire of the voters, his
own supporters, in the matter. In the end, he lost the referendum, and declared
that he would go ahead with a withdrawal anyway. But, deferring to the voters of
his party, he would only order a withdrawal from a few of the 24 towns and
villages in Gush Katif. A report harshly critical of this referndum and of Israel's presence
in Gaza noted the following:
Predictions from within Likud are that he will now offer only a
partial withdrawal from the Gaza Strip of only those of the 21 settlements
“most exposed” to violence. The occupation of the Gaza Strip would be
essentially unchanged. Enter Menny Mazuz. The attorney general
declared that Sharon had to pull out of the entire bloc of Gush Katif as he said
he would. What power had Mazuz, whose position as attorney general did not
qualify him to try to make security policy? Mazuz had possible indictments
sitting in his drawer - indictments of Ariel Sharon and his son Omri to begin
with, for various kinds of fraud, campaign violations, and the like.
Mazuz, who had been a protegé of Yossi Beilin, a staunch advocate of
withdrawal from Gaza, Judea and Samaria, was merely following "his" party line,
and using the indictments in the drawer as his weapon.
By 6 May 2004, Mr.
Sharon, picking up the hint, returned to the line of pulling out of Gush Katif
entirely, and stonewalled his way through the entire effort. And what was the
central plank of the "Kadima" party that Sharon founded in 2005 after the
withdrawal from Gush Katif? Withdrawal from all of Judea and Samaria,
unilaterally, if need be! This was the policy known as "convergence".
The loss in Lebanon basically did in that policy. Oh, Olmert will
pretend to support it, and his foreign minister Tzipi Livni will talk about a
"Palestinian state" and all that trash - but the people of Israel are not
willing to buy that bill of goods any more. But if a knight on a white horse
comes to the nation's rescue...
Knight on a White Horse
So
we see Olmert facing the desertion of his coalition as Kadima minister after
Kadima minister tries to figure out a way to replace Olmert without facing the
danger of new elections. Labor Minister Eitan Cabel quit the government urging
his fellow ministers from the Labor party to do likewise, including Mr. Peretz;
the chief of the coalition quit, calling upon Olmert to do likewise, Tzipi Livni
has already tried a putsch within the Kadima party - and failed. If you
examine this page listing articles in Haaretz, you'll see one major name in
Israeli politics absent.
Shim'on Peres.
Deputy Prime
Minister Shim'on Peres has been the eminence grise in this government,
the fellow who knows where all the bodies are buried (literally). While Olmert
has publicly faltered, Peres had remained quiet awaiting the release of the
interim report of the Winograd Committee to confirm the incompetence of Mr.
Olmert, his security minister and former chief of staff. But Peres moves carefully, and has
been campaigning quietly to oust Olmert and take the position himself. A Stratfor analysis dismisses him as a possible replacement
for Olmert, arguing that the situation calls for someone strong in security,
rather than diplomacy. That would rule out Tzipi Livni, who appears to enjoy the
support of the Hebrew press.
Let's take another look at Peres, then. It
can be fatal to under-estimate him. While he was never a general in the army, he
has credentials that make him very strong in the area of security. He initiated
atomic energy research in the 1950s in Israel and in the 1970's he was
instrumental in Israel's "acquiring" nuclear material for its clutch of nuclear
missiles. In 1976, he orchestrated the rescue of 100 Israeli hostages from
Uganda, the daring operation at the Entebbe airport that killed Yoni Netanyahu
and brought his brother Benyamin into the political limelight.
In
addition, Peres has a resource that virtually none of his contemporaries, friend
or foe, has - a solid Jesuit education. The Jesuits are famous for their ability
to teach strategic thinking, and Peres learned at their knee. Keeping this in
mind, let us look at three possible scenarios for the medium future.
1.
One is that Olmert is driven from office and is succeeded by Peres, who promises
to bring a fresh approach and to save the Kadima party from its natural fate -
extinction. But there is a corollary to this scenario, one that I've examined
before. This is that Katzav is also driven from office in one way or another,
and that Peres steps forth as the deGaulle of the country, seeking to combine
the posts of state president and prime minister and end the instability of the
country's political system. This is the "knight on a white horse scenario."
Given that there is virtually nobody else to run the country who has any level
of competence (with a couple of exceptions), the Israeli "maiden" kisses this
knight whom she has spurned so many times before.
2. The second is that
Olmert is driven from office and that either Tzipi Livni or Avi Dichter takes
his place. Katzav is driven from office in one way or another, and is replaced
by Peres as state president. Because of Peres' ties overseas, he exercises
considerable behind the scenes influence, far greater than his office warrants,
and he seems again to be a "knight on a white horse", serving as mentor for the
younger cabinet members and being invited to sit in on their meetings.
3.
The final scenario is that Olmert is able to hold onto the "seat" of prime
minister but is forced to accede to rule by others - like his deputy prime
minister, Peres.
What do all three scenarios have in common?
The
European Union, with some help from NATO, will be invited in to "expedite" the
"peace process" - that is to say drive out Jews from their homes in Judea,
Samaria, the Heights of the Golan, and very possibly parts of Jerusalem itself.
Thursday, May 03, 2007
Tzipi Livni had an opportunity to show that she was a
leader yesterday. She had the opportunity to reach out and grasp the golden ring
of power, to lead a revolution. Everyone expected her to. But yesterday when she
stepped up to microphone to make her move, she showed that her ability to lead
is no better than that of the person she wants to replace.
With the eyes of the country upon her she opened her
mouth for a bold declaration and out came a little squeak. Yes she called for
Olmert to quit, yes she indicated that she would like the party's leadership
position in the future----and then NOTHING !
A real leader would have said that if he doesn't
resign she would use every means possible to oust him. A real leader might have
even said "I think the people should decide if Olmert continues" and call for
new elections. A real leader would have found a way to keep the anti-Olmert
momentum going. But yesterday Tzipi Livni showed that she is NOT a real leader.
Ted Turner the sometimes nut bag
who started CNN once said, "either lead, follow or get the Hell out of the way
!!!" Tzipi did none of the above. Instead, she made a luke-warm fence sitting
declaration and decided to let everyone else do her do her dirty work. Livni
could have accelerated the momentum against Olmert, instead she slowed it
down.
A real leader takes bold
action during a crisis---Tzipi Livni made a tepid "vanilla" response, proving
that she is not a what Israel needs. She has no guts and should get no
glory.
View Original Article
Thursday, May 03, 2007
Michael Jansen via Jordan Times
Last summer’s Israeli onslaught on
Lebanon — an operation so fraught with doubts that it was initially
referred to as the “war with no name” — has been dubbed the “Second
Lebanon War” by Israel’s media. The politico-military establishment has
refused to give a formal name to the war — comparable to the 1982
“Peace for Galilee” and the 1996 “Grapes of Wrath” campaigns — because
Israel was defeated in battle for the first time by an Arab force.
Israel wears defeat badly.
This defeat was doubly
humiliating because the victor, the Lebanese Hizbollah movement, a
lightly armed paramilitary force, rather than a regular army with the
latest state-of-the-art weaponry matching, or bettering Israel’s vast
arsenal, drove Israel out of south Lebanon in 2000. So Israel cannot
claim it was outgunned or out-manoeuvred and outfought.
Having
tasted humiliation twice at the hands of Hizbollah, the angry and
frustrated Israeli military is muttering |
