DEBKAfile Exclusive Analysis
As the Hamas-led multiple missile offensive against
Israel marked its first week, voices were heard in Israel and overseas,
well-meaning or despairing, calling for Israel to start talks with the
Palestinian Islamist group’s leaders.
Hamas
soon knocked that notion on the head. After hurling some 150 missiles
against Israel, one of its officials, Nizhar Riyah, issued a clear
statement of intent Monday, May 21:
“Hamas is
determined to wipe Israel off the map and replace it with the state of
Palestine,” he said. Hamas will fight “until the last Jew is expelled”
- not only from Sderot but also from Ashkelon and “all of Palestine.”
In
February 2006, Hamas beat Mahmoud Abbas’ Fatah in the Palestinian
general elections, which the incoming Israeli prime minister Ehud
Olmert and Tzipi Livni, against every Israeli security interest,
allowed to take place.
Ret. Maj. Gen. Giora
Eiland, then head of Israel’s national security council, strongly
advised them to make the best of a bad job and engage the new
Palestinian leaders in talks. This recommendation was emphatically
reported by DEBKAfile’s analysts just days after the election. But it was turned down by leaders who preferred to follow advice from Washington.
Just
as US State Department urged Israel to permit an election which gave
Hamas its victory, officials at State also had a plan to deal with its
unfortunate aftermath: a campaign spearheaded by the US and Israel, and
adopted by the Middle East Quartet, to boost the Palestinian loser,
Fatah and its leader Mahmoud Abbas, and boycott the winning Hamas.
It was soon clear they had backed the losing horse - and still are.
In
the intervening 15 months, Hamas was not idle. Instead of breaking down
under international pressure, Hamas went from strength to strength,
taking advantage of Israel’s indecision and inaction and the
ineffectiveness of Abu Mazen and his sidekick Mohammed Dahlan.
The
Palestinian fundamentalists quickly jumped aboard the
Iranian-Syrian-Hizballah bandwagon. That bandwagon is now racing ahead
in the Middle East arena, leaving Israel behind with the United States
and its crises.
In these circumstances, and
after the Lebanon War less than a year ago, Israel must on no account
turn to Hamas for talks, because the only agenda on offer now would be
terms for Jewish state’s capitulation and demise.
The
outcome would reflect the consequences of Washington’s two years of
talks with Iraqi Sunni insurgent leaders, brokered by dozens of Arab
and Muslim mediators, including Jordan’s King Hussein. The result has
been the exacerbation of terror in Iraq.
For
Hamas, diplomacy would serve only as a respite to gear up for more
aggression. Saudi King Abdullah tried his hand in Mecca earlier this
year. Once again, Washington and Jerusalem were deluded into believing
the Saudi royal hand could tame Hamas and persuade its leaders to share
power with Fatah in a unity government.
Instead,
the group was strengthened in its radicalism; three months later it has
embarked on its current 20-missile-a-day offensive against Israel. Day
by day, Hamas spokesmen say the blitz of the western Negev is only the
first step in its open-ended war for the final goal of destroying
Israel.
Olmert told his second cabinet meeting on Gaza Sunday, May 20: “We will not let Hamas dictate our time table.”
But that is exactly what he has done in all his sixteen months in the prime minister’s office.
Israel exercises less control than ever before over the time table now that a disastrous factor has entered the equation.
Hamas’s
blitz against Israel is part and parcel of a savage offensive to
destroy the Palestinian Authority and oust Mahmoud Abbas, which is
aligned with Tehran’s overall strategy for anticipating two prospective
events in 2007 and 2008:
One is the beginning
of the withdrawal of the bulk of the US army from Iraq. The other is
the possibility, though not certainty, of an American military strike
against Iran’s nuclear installations and strategic infrastructure.
To
prepare for the two eventualities, Tehran is building a military and
logistical base in the Gaza Strip. Combined with Hizballah’s support
structures in Lebanon, the Gaza base will comprise not only a threat to
Israel, but also to US bases in Israel and Jordan and the American and
European fleets present in the eastern Mediterranean.
Israel’s
failure in the Lebanon War last year gave Iran an easy victory and a
free hand for upgrading its military strength in Lebanon. Tehran is
after the same effect in Gaza.
In the face of
this looming juggernaut, the Olmert government would be courting
disaster by entering into bargaining mode with Hamas – especially in
the absence of any realistic strategy for repelling it.
The
Olmert-Livni policy, joined by defense minister Amir Peretz, has
consisted until now of lurching from crisis to crisis and applying
patches for makeshift repairs. This path left Israel groping among hard
options:
On the one hand, they have held back
from ordering an effective military operation against Hamas – and not
only because of the brakes applied by Washington. After the Lebanon
fiasco, the trio is afraid the IDF is not up to delivering the goods,
naturally preferring to make the army accountable for that conflict’s
shortcomings rather than their own faulty leadership.
On
the other hand, Olmert has obstinately held back from diplomacy with
Hamas. Therefore, if anyone has maneuvered Israel into its present
tight corner, it is not Iran or Hamas, but his misguided policies.
In these circumstances, Israel has three available courses of action:
1.
To embark on full-scale war in the Gaza Strip, turning the tide of the
Lebanon setback and seriously impairing Iran’s plans for exploiting the
territory.
2. Carry on as before, that is
dithering while the missiles rain down from Gaza – and not only against
Sderot and its neighbors, but also strategic Israel towns which the
improved Qassam missiles can reach. The air force will continue to
execute pinpoint reprisals including targeted assassinations of Hamas
leaders. Not all will hit their mark, like the attack on the Gaza home
of key Hamas spiritual and strategic leader, Khalil al-Yahya, Sunday
night.
3. Do nothing and wait for the American
attack on Iran while the situation deteriorates, in the hope of some
outside force stepping in and taking the job out of Israel’s hands.
All
three options are obviously unhealthy for Israel. But not much is left
for a government which is too muddled to see its way to clear and
logical action in the real Middle East arena.
